

THE ISRAELI SOLUTION TO PALESTINIAN TERRORISM:
THE ISRAELI SECURITY FENCE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2006

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 16-06-2006		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) Aug 2005 - Jun 2006	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Israeli Solution to Palestinian Terrorism: The Israeli Security Fence				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Irwin Jr., Joseph T., MAJ				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 1 Reynolds Ave. Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This research examined the Israeli Security Fence and attempted to determine whether or not the Israeli Security Fence is an effective solution to reduce Palestinian terrorism in Israel. The research used a historical examination of separation walls, the current situation of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and the other factors surrounding the security fence to determine if the Israeli Security Fence objectives can be achieved. To address the primary and subordinate questions with this study, the researcher conducted a lengthy literature review covering three main topics: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, historical separation walls, and Israeli Security Fence plans. As a result of this study, the researcher will be better able to support Army operations involving force protection matters and will be a more informed officer regarding terrorism. The Israeli Security Fence as an effective solution to reduce Palestinian terrorism in Israel only scratches the surface of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Therefore, the researcher recommends that as a security system the Israeli Security Fence should be further studied after it is fully implemented. Additionally, the following areas of emphasis may assist in the understanding of the possible outcomes the construction of the Security Fence may create: (1) combating an insurgency using security and separation; (2) economic impacts of separation of populations and its effects on an insurgency; (3) external support of the Palestinian Authority and its economic impact on terrorism in Israel; (4) the strategy of terrorism, counterterrorism, and politics in Israel and Palestine; and (5) Israeli counterterrorism operational factors and effects in the West Bank.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Israeli Security Fence, Palestinian Terrorism in Israel, Israel, Terrorism, Separation Walls, Security, Palestinian-Israeli Conflict					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified	UU	72	

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE ISRAELI SOLUTION TO PALESTINIAN TERRORISM: THE ISRAELI SECURITY FENCE, by MAJ Joseph T. Irwin Jr., 72 pages.

This research examined the Israeli Security Fence and attempted to determine whether or not the Israeli Security Fence is an effective solution to reduce Palestinian terrorism in Israel. The research used a historical examination of separation walls, the current situation of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and the other factors surrounding the security fence to determine if the Israeli Security Fence objectives can be achieved. To address the primary and subordinate questions with this study, the researcher conducted a lengthy literature review covering three main topics: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, historical separation walls, and Israeli Security Fence plans. As a result of this study, the researcher will be better able to support Army operations involving force protection matters and will be a more informed officer regarding terrorism.

The Israeli Security Fence as an effective solution to reduce Palestinian terrorism in Israel only scratches the surface of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Therefore, the researcher recommends that as a security system the Israeli Security Fence should be further studied after it is fully implemented. Additionally, the following areas of emphasis may assist in the understanding of the possible outcomes the construction of the Security Fence may create: (1) combating an insurgency using security and separation; (2) economic impacts of separation of populations and its effects on an insurgency; (3) external support of the Palestinian Authority and its economic impact on terrorism in Israel; (4) the strategy of terrorism, counterterrorism, and politics in Israel and Palestine; and (5) Israeli counterterrorism operational factors and effects in the West Bank.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was completed with the patience of my family and the guidance of my committee members. The challenges and frustrations of this process were greatly outweighed by the educational benefits I received during my MMAS journey. The opportunity to work with professional faculty, committee members and fellow students greatly enhanced this experience. I appreciate the assistance and encouragement of all involved. I want to single out a true caring and dedicated professional Ms. Helen Davis who helped me as well as many others with the formatting of this project. Her dedication to the students in the MMAS program is truly outstanding. Finally, I want to thank COL (Ret) Mary Goodwin for her recommendation that I enroll in the MMAS program while working as a member of the CGSC Staff.

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ACRONYMS

ISF	Israeli Security Fence
MOD	Ministry of Defense
PA	Palestinian Authority
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

The creation of the state of Israel was at the expense of the Palestinians. The indigenous Arab population of Palestine has been systematically discriminated against since the Balfour Declaration in 1917, which created Israel for the Jews at the expense of a native population, which has been denied its own nationhood and become a dispossessed, marginalized people. (2001, 209)

Cohn-Sherbok, The Palestine–Israeli Conflict

Over the centuries, the Jews have been exposed to hatred and violence in many of the countries where they have settled. What could be more justified than the creation of a homeland for the Jews in the land of their origins, Israel – a state where Jewish national identity can be recognized and where the inhabitants can finally be safe from persecution? (2001, 209)

El-Alami, The Palestine–Israeli Conflict

The unending conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis in Israel today is a continuous tragedy of errors in world political leadership. This conflict is rooted in ancient history, framed by religious fanaticism, and continued today in uncompromising and unacceptable hard-line political positions. For the casual observer, the conflict in the Middle East is nothing more than endless murder, violence, and suffering; the participants on both sides are guilty of mutual destruction. However, the Palestinian method of terrorizing and attacking Israeli civilians by using suicide bombers has forced the Israeli government to implement new strategies to protect its citizenry. Palestinians view Israeli retaliatory strikes against terrorist cells and leadership as a form of terrorism. To understand what is currently happening in Israel today, one must discuss in general

terms how the situation came to exist. The current Israeli solution to this conflict is unilateral separation.

Historical Conflict

Throughout Jewish history, the Jewish people believed their Messiah would come and deliver all Jews to their ancient homeland in Palestine. This messianic belief was a divine promise and certainly a predetermined event (Cohn-Sherbok and El-Alami, 3). However, this passive religious interpretation gave way slowly to the Zionist movement. Religious Zionists are Jews that believe that to usher in the Messiah, Jews must first create a nation in their ancient homeland of Palestine which will trigger the coming of the Messiah (Cohn-Sherbok and El-Alami, 3). Rabbi Shema Yisrael advocated in 1798 the establishment of Jewish colonies in Palestine. Throughout history the Jewish people were persecuted wherever they settled. The Zionist movement gained momentum at the height of this persecution during World War II due to the discovery of the holocaust of millions of Jews by the German Nazi regime. With limited world support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, the State of Israel was born and simultaneously the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Cohn-Sherbok and El-Alami 2001, 21-54).

Purpose of Research

Political organizations that are small and radical in nature are generally ignored by mainstream news outlets, political parties, and governments. These organizations sometimes turn to terrorism as a way to force governments to take notice or deal with their specific ideology. Fear and chaos are tools used by terrorists to advertise political goals in an effort to obtain relevancy. In many cases, news outlets, political parties, and

governments give terrorism credibility by reacting to political demands after terrorist attacks. Terrorism continues to evolve and is not a new weapon that attempts to use violence to achieve political and military objectives. When a population is held hostage by terrorism, a government's responsibility is to protect its citizens. Israelis in particular have a reasonable expectation for their government to defend Israel from terrorist attacks directed at civilians. Conversely, Palestinian authorities have a responsibility to their citizens to build a viable state, protect their citizens from Israeli attacks, and prevent disruption of their populace. Israel has chosen a method of protection that separates its citizenry from the Palestinian population since the current methods have failed to prevent attacks generated by the Palestinians.

The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is fairly simple in terms of the goals and objectives of each side. The Israelis and Palestinians are fighting over the same land and geography of different religious holy sites, and they are divided by ethnicity, religion, language, and culture. These two opposing populations seek governance over the same land area but not governance over each other. Each population is surrounded by the other, and both sides believe the other is an illegitimate occupying force. Each side holds the other hostage through economic and military force and disruption, and destruction of both military and/or civilian targets. Each side believes wholeheartedly that it has the morale high ground. Historically military victories have finalized disputes. However, despite military victories by Israel, the Palestinian issue remains unresolved.

Primary Research Question

Is the Israeli Security Fence an effective solution to reduce Palestinian terrorism in Israel? This research question is critical as it examines the reasons why the fence is

being constructed and whether or not the separation of the populations of Palestinians and Israelis will achieve Israel's desired results.

Subordinate Questions

The following subordinate questions relate directly to the primary question and contribute to explaining and narrowing the research applied work.

1. What are the Israelis' objectives of the security fence?
2. Which security fence construction plan will best achieve the Israelis' objectives?
3. What historical separation walls have achieved objectives similar to those of the Israeli security fence?
4. How is the peace process affected by the security fence construction?

Delimitations

For the purpose of this thesis the time period as it relates to the primary research question will cover terrorism in Israel from September 2000 through January 2006. This thesis considered but will not discuss legal issues surrounding human rights abuses, civil liberties, international law, or any other legal aspects related to the Israeli Security Fence. Terrorism is considered and discussed but limited only to the areas of attack originating in Palestinian populated areas executed from Gaza and the West Bank. Therefore, Palestinian political issues in terms of populations displaced in, or terrorism from Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan were not researched. Additionally, the researcher broadly examined the economic and socioeconomic aspects of the security fence. Accordingly, the researcher focused primarily on the Israeli goals, objectives, and

expected outcomes of the security fence. Furthermore, an examination of historical divides and the effects of separation on populations have achieved throughout history was broadly discussed. Finally, two plans for building the security fence were considered and reviewed but ruled out. One was the Encirclement Fence plan and the other was the Geneva Accords Plan. Both are universally considered to be radical and unlikely solutions that would be ruled out by either side as unacceptable, untenable, or impossible to reach a consensus (Makovsky 2004, 1-60). This thesis will analyze the Israeli objectives for the security fence in comparison to walls and barriers in history and ultimately decide if the fence is a solution to reducing Palestinian terrorism in Israel. Additionally, a recommendation will be made as to what plan currently proposed best sets forth the conditions for the Israeli security fence to achieve its objectives.

Walls and Barriers in History

Walls have a long pedigree in the Holy Land. Ancient Jericho was famous for its wall, and Jerusalem's Old City is still encircled by a stone structure whose foundation dates back centuries. Over time, it has helped stop, or at least slow, onrushing armies of Seljuks, Crusaders, and Mongols. From the centuries-old Great Wall of China to the short-lived Berlin Wall, barriers have long insulated tribes, cities, even civilizations, demarcating "us" on the inside from "them" on the outside. (2004, 3)

Alan Marison

Throughout history, the separation of populations attempted to prevent violence, achieve geographical defensible positions, accomplish political and economic goals, and force negotiation. An examination of historical walls and barriers which divide populations must be compared and contrasted to the security fence under construction in Israel today. For example, Berlin was divided by the victors of World War II and

“became a prize which neither the USSR nor the Western Allies could concede to the other” (Williamson 2003, 1). The creation of the Berlin wall was a political attempt to control the population of Berlin and prevent German unification. Separation of the populations of East and West Germany is different than the separation of the populations of Israelis and Palestinians. The Germans on both sides of the Berlin wall were the same ethnically, racially, and religiously and shared a common language. However, each side was controlled by a government that was ideologically opposed. To ensure separation of these populations, the Berlin Wall was constructed by the East German government which, at the time, was under the control of the Soviet Union.

The wall became a front line during the Cold War and at times contributed to the possibility of World War III (Williamson 2003). At other times it could be argued that the Berlin wall actually prevented World War III because of the problems it forced each side to consider without risking war over the crisis it created (Williamson 2003).

The divisions caused by the wall essentially were emotional and economic due to the separation between the German populace. This is similar to the divisions caused by the separation of the Israelis and Palestinians by the Israeli Security Fence. The populations on both sides of the security fence are emotionally charged, and economic life is determined by the location of the security fence. For the Palestinians, the location of the security fence affects their economic survival, and they are emotionally affected by its construction. During the Berlin Wall era, Germans were divided from their families, their property, and their community, and they were separated by two different political and socio-economic systems. The Berlin Wall was used by the Soviets as a political bargaining chip, and it was the most contested issue of most, if not all, the talks between

the two opposing sides during the Cold War (Williamson 2003). “It was Khrushchev who crudely observed Berlin is the testicles of the West . . . every time I want to make the West scream I squeeze on Berlin” (Williamson 2003, 2). The Israeli security fence may give the Israelis a bargaining chip in the future peace negotiations. That is, the Israelis may build the security fence in a way to give them the ability to make concessions after its construction. Every time Israel wants to squeeze the Palestinian Authority all it must do is close the fence or refuse to negotiate final placement of specific sections.

Another barrier was the institution of the Apartheid system of South Africa. Apartheid was a political system which from its inception was solely intended to divide a country based on race. This system was designed to enable a white racial minority to control all aspects of governance over the majority black population. The apartheid system used government to create virtual walls between the white minority and the black majority populace in all aspects of life. Furthermore, the South African government created Bantustans that segregated and separated the populations of white and black communities. These Bantustans were similar to what the Palestinians now call the encirclement fence.

The creation of the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), a series of walls and fences, at the end of the Korean War is another example of a barrier that affected the separation of two populations of opposing governmental ideologies. Much like the Berlin Wall the Korean DMZ is manned with armies and weapons pointed at one another. Also, like Germany, the DMZ divides a population that is ethnically, racially, and religiously alike. Different political systems and ideologies are the reasons for this separation of one people. The DMZ has prevented a continuing war, separated families, stopped economic

trade within the Korean peninsula between the two sides, and ensured the conflict has remained ongoing, albeit without constant violence. The Korean DMZ is similar to the Israeli security fence in that the both sides are armed and hostile to the other. The Israelis have their Israeli Defense Force that moves into and out of Palestinian populated areas at will, while the Palestinians infiltrate the Israeli areas and conduct suicide bombings.

Another example of the dividing of populations is the separation wall in Cyprus that separated Greek and Turkish Cypriots for over thirty years. The Turkish Cypriots were separated behind a wall built by their military and left in an area that is cut off from the rest of the island. Commerce between the two zones was extremely limited due to the nature of the divide and may be a good example in comparison to the Palestinian areas that are severed economically by the security fence. Recently, the Cyprus wall has opened, and travel between the two sides is now authorized. While the Greek Cypriots are celebrating what they hope is the beginning of a peaceful solution to their struggle. The Palestinians may hope that the Israeli Security Fence will also lead to what may become a peaceful solution to their conflict with Israel.

The Great Wall of China is an example of a wall used successfully to control populations by preventing invasions and migrations of various portions of the Chinese population. This great wall was a successful barrier for generations, and if done properly, the Israeli Security Fence could change the direction of the violence in present day Israel.

Likewise, walls and fences separate Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. These barriers are based on sectarian divides and are called Peace Walls. The Peace Walls are high fences and barriers placed through neighborhoods where religious enemies live together yet are separated to prevent further violence. In areas where the

Peace Walls are necessary violence has stopped or slowed to a trickle. Fortunately, by simply separating factions that cannot put down their hatred the peace walls in Northern Ireland have been effective, despite cost to the social and economic areas where the Peace Walls were constructed. The sectarian barriers and walls constructed in Ireland may have provided Israel additional techniques to employ to reduce violence. The Israeli Security Fence may be considered a success if it is able to contribute to the reduction of violence as effectively as did the Peace Walls in Northern Ireland.

Peace Process

The modern peace process is defined as a “cycle of activities necessary to produce a just and lasting agreement” (Darby 2001, 11). The process begins with negotiations over a period of time combined with implementation of steps which may or may not be linear (Darby 2001, 11). The final phase of the peace process covers periods after a peace accord has been established and after its agreed upon points are carried out (Darby 2001, 11). Furthermore, due to the long periods of discussions, execution of the settlement is in the end affected by the injection of further issues to be haggled over. A peace process has the following criteria:

1. The protagonists must be willing to negotiate in good faith
2. The key actors must be included in the process
3. The negotiations must address the central issues in the dispute
4. Force must not be used to achieve objectives
5. The negotiators must be committed to a sustained process (Darby 2001, 11)

The Israelis have sought to conduct negotiations with the Palestinians to bring about a permanent peace. In 1993, the two sides signed the Oslo Accords, and Israel believed it had secured an acceptable peace process by trading land for security. But after some initial progress, this peace process was derailed, and by 2000, violence (Intifada II

or the Al Aqsa Intifada) against Israel increased. Israel countered with violent responses, and what should have been a peaceful solution became a stalemate of escalating violence. The Palestinians, unable to defeat Israeli police and defense forces, began to employ suicide or homicide bombings more frequently as a tactic to gain additional concessions from the Israelis. Finally, in 2003, mostly as a response to suicide bombings mounted from the West Bank, the Israelis embarked upon a unilateral solution to Palestinian terrorism by building the Israeli Security Fence as a measure to secure an acceptable alternative to the failed peace process.

In order to discuss the Israeli Security Fence, the Arab-Israeli conflict must be reviewed, as well as the current situation regarding the peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis, the intifada, and suicide bombings. To understand the reasons for the Israeli security fence and the possible outcomes of building it, this paper will look at the Israeli objectives of the security fence and the changing landscape of the peace process resulting from the construction of the fence.

Terrorism in Israel

Terrorism is not new in Israel. Since the creation of Israel conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians has remains constant. The tactic of terrorism has been used in the past but was primarily limited to hostage taking, car bombs, and other forms of violence traditionally used by various Palestinian factions that oppose the State of Israel. Combating terrorism in Israel has always been challenging; however, the rise of suicide bombers in Israel has made security of Israeli citizens an extremely difficult task. With the populations of the opposing sides separated by geography, and with clear evidence

that the suicide or homicide bombers are infiltrating Israeli populations from Palestinian areas, an antiterrorist fence is under construction by the Israelis to stop these attacks.

From October 2000 to July 2003, 293 Israelis were killed, and 1,950 were wounded by suicide bombers in only 63 attacks (Lerner 2004). However, since 2003 when the construction of the security fence began, the homicide or suicide attack techniques began to shift. From August 2003 to June 30, 2004, the Palestinian terrorists infiltrated through areas in the northern West Bank where the security fence had not been completed and successfully killed 26 Israelis and wounded 76 (Lerner 2004). In locations where a portion of the security fence has already been completed, terrorist attacks have been significantly lower: “From 26 attacks per year prior to the establishment of the fence, to three the year following the completion of the fence” and “from an average of 103 Israelis murdered a year prior to the establishment of the fence, down to 28 the year following the completion of the fence” (Lerner 2004). Furthermore, in areas where the fence is planned but not yet constructed, attacks continue (Makovsky 2004, 23-27).

Three proposals that differ from the current fence construction plan as constructed by the Israeli Ministry of Defense are the following: The Geneva Accords, Clinton Parameters, and the Encirclement Fence (Makovsky 2004, 23-36). Each proposal would provide a barrier fence at variance to the current Ministry of Defense plan, with varying possibilities of success. The Palestinians believe the final fence will completely encircle Palestinian populated areas in the northern and southern areas of the West Bank, the so called Encirclement Fence. This belief has provoked the emotions of the Palestinians as well as increased violence among the supporters of Palestinian terrorist organizations. Countering this terrorism is a primary goal of the Israeli Security Fence.

Countering Terrorism

Countering terrorism has always been a challenge for Israel as terrorism in one form or another has plagued Israel since its creation. Years of varying levels of insurgency from terrorism to guerrilla warfare have forced Israel to counter terrorism using many different tactics. From negotiations, to covert operations, to invading neighboring guerrilla heavens, such as Lebanon, Israel has sought to limit violence against its citizens (Levy 2000, 53-54). In the late 1980s, Israeli counterterrorism efforts had been somewhat effective; however, the overall cause for Palestinian unrest still revolved around the desire for a Palestinian state (Levy 2000, 54-66). The solution to the violence against Israelis was a peace process in Oslo that was based upon trading land for security. One outcome of the Oslo peace process was the Israeli attempt to secure an agreement from the Palestinian Authority to conduct counterterrorism operations against Palestinian terrorist groups (Levy 2000, 64). That is, the Palestinian Authority agreed to stop Palestinian terrorist groups from operating inside of Palestinian-controlled areas. Because the Palestinian Authority failed to execute this pledge, Israel began construction of the Israeli Security Fence.



Figure 1. Typical Israeli Security Fence Photo

Source: Israeli Ministry of Defense, 2006

Official Description of the Israeli Security Fence

According to the Israeli Ministry of Defense, the “Security Fence project is to provide a response to the threats posed to the State of Israel and protect its population from the threat of terror and criminal activity” (Israeli Ministry of Defense, 2006).

Furthermore, the Security Fence is a multilayered composite obstacle comprised of several elements:

1. Ditch with fence covered by barbed wire
2. Patrol road on both sides of the fence
3. And a “intrusion--detection fence with sensors to alert Israeli Defense Forces of any incursions
4. Sand pit areas next to the fence to detect tracks

5. A solid barrier system in select areas to prevent sniper fire along urban areas and roads
6. Observation towers and checkpoints (Israeli Ministry of Defense 2006).




Figure 2. Israeli Security Fence with description

Source: Israeli Ministry of Defense, 2006

Security Fence Stated Purpose

According to the Israeli Ministry of Defense, “The Security Fence is being built with the sole purpose of saving the Israeli citizens who continue to be targeted by the terrorist campaign in 2000.” Israel recognized that Palestinian terrorism is the root cause of violence against its citizens and therefore, the Israeli Security Fence “is intended to counter terrorism” (Israeli Ministry of Defense 2006). In terms of using the fence as a diplomatic instrument of power, the government of Israel recognized that the security

fence “is a temporary tool needed to protect innocents while diplomatic efforts towards a lasting peace continue” (Israeli Ministry of Defense, 2006).

Israeli Response to Humanitarian concerns

Israel is committed to “balance the imperative to protect innocent lives from terror with the humanitarian needs of the local Palestinian population” (Israeli Ministry of Defense, 2006). The following is a list of the socioeconomic factors that the Israelis are using when constructing the Security Fence:

1. Use State land wherever possible
2. Provide access to farmland
3. Protect Palestinian property owners
4. Continue access into Israel for employment and commerce (Israeli Ministry of Defense, 2006)

The Palestinians feel that the Israeli Security Fence is an economic and emotional stranglehold because the fence will “hermetically seal the surrounding villages off from Israel, as well as from some of their agricultural land,” causing many to live off of “charity” (Kershner 2005, 98). Therefore, it is imperative that Israel address the humanitarian concerns of the Palestinians. Failure to address the socio-economic needs of the Palestinians may doom the Israeli Security Fence to failure.

Summary

This research examined the Israeli Security Fence and attempted to determine whether or not the Israeli Security Fence is an effective solution to reduce Palestinian terrorism in Israel. The research used a historical examination of separation walls, the current situation of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and the other factors surrounding the security fence to determine if the Israeli security fence objectives can be achieved. To

address the primary and subordinate questions with this study, the researcher conducted a lengthy literature review covering three main topics: Palestinian-Israeli conflict, historical separation walls, and Israeli Security Fence plans. As a result of this study, the researcher will be better able to support Army operations involving force protection matters and will be a more informed officer regarding terrorism.

CHAPTER 2

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Where the Ch'in built a wall to keep out the Tartars,
The Han still light a beacon fire. Beacon fires are lit without cease,
And fighting goes on without end...
How well we know the cures of war;
May the wise rulers follow it only as the last recourse! (Nathan and
Ross 1997)

Li-Po, "They Fought South of the Walls"

The research methodology stated in chapter five enabled the researcher to highlight each of the five steps used by the researcher while answering the primary question: Is the Israeli Security Fence an effective solution to reduce Palestinian terrorism in Israel? Answering that question, the researcher analyzed each of the three categories comparing which contributed to a successful outcome, and which led to a negative outcome. Once this analysis was completed, the researcher presented the results in this chapter. The following are the Israeli objectives for the security fence:

1. Prevent, slow, or stop terrorist attacks originating from Palestinian populace centers against Israeli citizens to minimal acceptable levels
2. Control the agenda of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process by unilaterally seizing the initiative beginning with the construction of the security fence
3. Create a de facto two-state solution with semi-permanent yet flexible boundaries between Israel and Palestine.

4. Set the conditions for serious negotiations with the Palestinians from a position of strength and unstoppable yet modifiable facts on the ground with the completion of the security fence

5. Defeat an insurgency against Israel and maintain the State of Israel as a sustainable Jewish majority.

By creating a two-state solution, Israel effectively can achieve two national goals. The first is to preserve the Jewish majority in Israel and the second is to facilitate a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians as well as Israel and its Arab neighbors. To maintain a Jewish State, Israel must continue to be the majority population in Israel. However, the Jewish majority has been shrinking since 1985, and current projections show that by 2010 a Jewish majority west of the Jordan will be a very narrow one. Building the Israeli Security Fence will maintain a Jewish majority in a Jewish state whether or not the Palestinian state fails. For Israel to maintain a Jewish state, separation must be done now, or the opportunity will slip away.

Table 1. Jewish Population Between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea	
1985	60.0 percent Jewish majority
2000	55.5 percent Jewish majority
2010	51.1 percent Jewish majority
2020	46.7 percent Jewish minority
2050	37.4 percent Jewish minority

Source: Makovsky 2004.

Palestinians are split into three categories:

1. Those who reside outside of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza
2. Those who reside in Israel
3. Those who reside in the area controlled by the Palestinian Authority

The Palestinian population inside of Israel continues to outgrow the Jewish population.

This fact is partially responsible for the Israeli transfer of Gaza and parts of the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority. This transfer is not just a transfer of land but a transfer of responsibility for the population in these areas. Israel does not want to be responsible for a majority population of Palestinians in Israel. If Israel were responsible for a majority population of Palestinians in Israel, the Palestinians would be able to make territorial demands that a minority Jewish government in Israel would not be able to ignore. Long ago, the Palestinians began to make territorial demands based upon ethnicity. “The extent to which an ethnic group makes territorial demands on the state is clearly related to the absolute size of the group and to the pattern of territorial distribution of the group itself” (Coakley 1993, 7). These claims become more valid under the following conditions:

1. The group increases as a proportion of the population of “its” territory
2. The proportion of the total membership of the group within this territory increases (Coakley 1993, 7)

Israel must ensure that the Palestinian and Israeli populations are territorially divided in a way that maintains Israel both as a democracy and as a Jewish state.

Ministry of Defense

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) fence plan is currently being implemented. This fence is “intended as a buffer, one that would protect all Israeli citizens inside Israel

proper as well as approximately 169,000 (or 76 percent) of Israeli settlers in the West Bank” (Makovsky, 2004, 24). This plan constructs the fence near the 1967 Green Line with planned or projected areas that incorporate large Israeli settlements in the West Bank. This is important because the Green Line is a boundary that is politically amicable to both a majority of Israelis and Palestinians as a starting point for negotiations leading to possible final solution to their territorial dispute. The Israelis have begun construction of the fence along the MOD route but seem to be willing to negotiate or use the planned route as a bargaining chip with the Palestinians. The Palestinians fear that the MOD fence is only a first phase in a larger plan to extend the fence route deeper into the West Bank, encircling the Palestinians and occupying additional territory. The MOD fence, if completed as planned, will divide the West Bank area leaving 12.5 percent of the West Bank on the Israeli side (Makovsky 2004, 23-27). If completed in this manner, 12,845 Palestinians or 0.7 percent in 35 communities will remain on the Israeli side of the fence, while 1,927,536 (99.3 percent) in 603 communities will remain on the Palestinian side (Makovsky 2004, 23-27). Israeli settlers remaining on the Palestinian side would total 54,174 or 24 percent in 74 settlements with 169,365 or 76 percent in 52 settlements on the Israeli side of the fence (Makovsky 2004, 23-27). This plan in terms of demographic separation only slightly differs from the Clinton Parameters. The key difference is the breakdown of total West Bank territory. Because the MOD plan is very close to the Clinton Parameters it is believed by Israel to be politically acceptable by their key ally, the United States.

Clinton Parameters

In late 2000, President Bill Clinton of the United States attempted to secure an agreement between the Palestinian Authority and the Israelis by negotiating the future borders of Israel and Palestine. The two sides were very close to agreeing to what is now referred to as the Clinton Parameters. Some believe that construction of a barrier along this proposed future boundary would make a lasting peace more feasible (Makovsky 2004, 30-32). This fence construction plan became known in Israel as the Clinton Parameters. Essentially, the Clinton Parameters are modifications to the MOD fence plan. The Clinton Parameters, if implemented, would divide the West Bank area leaving only 5 percent of the West Bank on the Israeli side (Makovsky 2004, 30-32). If completed in this manner, only 5 communities with 7,076 or .4 percent of the Palestinian population would remain on the Israeli side of the fence, while 1,933,305 (99.6 percent) in 633 communities will remain on the Palestinian side (Makovsky 2004, 30-32). Israeli settlers remaining on the Palestinian side would total 59,043 or 26 percent in 81 settlements with 164,496 or 74 percent in 45 settlements on the Israeli side of the fence (Makovsky 2004, 30-32). The key differences in this plan involve Israel's providing additional West Bank territory to the Palestinian Authority and lowering the number of Palestinians on the Israeli side.

Terrorist Attack Trends in Israel

The geography and intermingling of the Israeli and Palestinian populations has ensured that "there's almost no place in Israel that's not in short rocket range from some Arab location or other" (Kershner 2005, 77). While suicide attacks have decreased, mortar and rocket attacks have continually increased. Each year, as the amount of

completed fence increased, both the number of suicide attacks, Israeli fatalities and injuries decreased. Furthermore, the number of prevented attacks was also increased (see figures 3 and 4).




Figure 3. Fence Completed vs Israeli Fatalities
Source: (Erlich 2006; and Israeli Ministry of Defense 2006).

Attacks may have subsided due to “doggedly thorough intelligence work of the Israeli Shin Bet internal security service and the army’s operational brawn” (Kershner 2005, 88). However, it is also possible that attacks have subsided because “ordinary Palestinians, worn down by years of security closures and financial stress, are suffering from intifada fatigue, translated into waning of support for continuing violence” (Kershner 2005, 88). In 2006, the Israeli Ministry of Defense stated “that until the

Palestinians end incitement for terror and actually stop terrorists, Israel will defend its citizens.”




Figure 4. Fence Completed vs Israeli Injured
Source: (Erlich 2006; and Israeli Ministry of Defense 2006).

Countering Terrorism and Counterinsurgency

Countering Palestinian terrorism in Israel is synonymous with countering an insurgency. In *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* (2005) methods in countering an insurgency are set forth. Comparing the terrorist problem to an insurgency sheds light on the way Israel is attempting to prevent terrorism with the security fence. To stop terrorism in Israel, the Israelis must conduct effective counterinsurgency operations. The Palestinians are currently conducting an effective long-term insurgency within Israel and especially in Israeli occupied areas. The insurgency is not being conducted by

traditional citizens of Israel, but by Palestinians inside and outside of Israel's borders. To combat this insurgency, the Israelis must remove the conditions for a successful insurgency. For an insurgency to be effective conditions must include the following:

- (1) A cause
- (2) A police and administrative weakness in the counterinsurgent camp
- (3) A not too hostile geographic environment
- (4) Outside support in the middle and later stages of an insurgency (Galula 2005, 43)

The terrorist organizations operating in Israel operate much like an insurgency. The Palestinians have a cause behind which they are vigorously united. To remove the cause the Israelis must attempt to provide a solution in a manner that is acceptable to the majority of Palestinians. This is extremely difficult because Israel must also not anger its own citizens who have Palestinian connections. Furthermore, the Israelis must also conduct operations in a manner that maintains political support for the counterterrorism activities without splintering its supporters into factions such as pro-settler groups versus those who support land for peace and separation initiatives.

Palestinian goals are the following:

1. A sovereign state of Palestine with its capital in Jerusalem
2. A geographical homeland linked to Muslim holy sites in the contested areas of Jerusalem
3. An end to Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict focuses control over the population and land which determines the wealth of the state or opposing terrorist organizations; the one that becomes the wealthiest through this control usually becomes the winner (Levy 2000, 22).

Modified Mystic Diamond




Figure 5. Modified Mystic Diamond

Source: (Levy 2000)

The researcher modified the “Mystic Diamond Model” which is one way to portray the battle to control the level of Palestinian terrorism in Israel (Levy 2000, 22-23). This system graphically reveals how “internal” and “external” support provides fuel to the conflict between the State of Israel and the Palestinians. The battle over weapons, cash, and supporters creates a “cycle” of support, terrorism or prevention of terrorism, and increased or decreased support based upon the success or failure of terrorist attacks which determines the level of Palestinian terrorism in Israel (Levy 2000, 22-23).




Figure 6. Modified Pump Model

Source: (Levy 2000).

The researcher modified the “pump” model which is used to describe the process of “internal” versus “external” support provided to the Palestinian terrorists or the State of Israel as a “system” of the “Mystic Diamond model” (Levy 2000, 22-25). The modified “pump model” describes a struggle to prevent or carry out Palestinian terrorism through “outputs” that are events such as terrorist attacks or interdicted attacks. As successful terrorist attacks occur supporters “pump” additional resources such as weapons, cash, or manpower to fill the depleted resources used during the aforementioned successful terrorist attacks. The prevention of these Palestinian terrorist attacks must occur prior to or below the event horizon and focus on the Israeli population. Terrorist attacks that occur above the event horizon are the “output” of Palestinian

terrorist groups and are successes viewed by internal and external supporters which “pump” resources (weapons, cash, or manpower) back into the insurgent Palestinian terrorist groups to replace the depleted resources and therefore enabling additional attacks. The war on Palestinian terrorism is conducted and fought by attempting to seal off resources or “inputs” into the Palestinian insurgent terrorist groups. The Israeli population is the battlefield and the international community is the theater of war. The insurgency is either successful through terrorism and grows, or is prevented through counter-insurgent tactics that deplete its resources. The Israeli Security Fence attempts to reduce Palestinian terrorism by separating the insurgent terrorists from their resources and their targets in the Israeli populace.

With the construction of the fence and a de facto creation of a Palestinian State the question of Jerusalem will remain. Therefore, this grievance will not be resolved by the current planned location of the security fence or under any proposed plans. For the Israeli counter-insurgent operations to be successful they must also solve the problem of the status of Jerusalem.

Unfortunately for the Israelis, the Palestinians have the perfect conditions for conducting insurgent terrorist activities. Israel is geographically and demographically ideal for an insurgency. Israel’s weakness in its “police and administrative” abilities is simply the control of the Palestinian insurgent which the Israeli Security Fence attempts to address (Galula 2005, 43). Furthermore, the Palestinian terrorists or insurgents are supported by a wide array of outside support making counterterrorism extremely difficult.

Gaza Case Study

The Gaza strip is a microcosm of what the Israeli Security Fence may achieve. The Gaza Strip is an “oblong patch of land on the Mediterranean all of 40 kilometers long and six to ten kilometers wide” (Kerhsner 2005, 161). The Israeli military constructed a fence around Gaza in 1994 along the Green Line. The reason was to prevent attacks using “high-tech sensors, a bulldozed security buffer zone, barbed wire, and ditches” (Kerhsner 2005, 161). Effectively, the “smart fence” sealed terrorists inside of Gaza from conducting suicide attacks inside of Israel. (Kershner 2005, 161). However, the second and third order effects of this counter terrorism tactic were the economic hardships imposed upon the Palestinian populace inside of Gaza, causing increased support for the terrorist groups which began looking for ways to breach the obstacle preventing successful attacks. (Kerhsner 2005, 161). Terrorist organizations began new and innovative ways to strike at Israel from the heart of the barricaded Gaza Strip. Tactics included obtaining weapons and sneaking them into Gaza from Egypt and the fabrication of mortar and rocket systems to shoot at Israelis with impunity (Kershner 2005, 161-162).

In late 2000, the Gaza fence was rendered ineffective by Palestinians destroying large sections of fence during the second intifada. This allowed the Israeli Defense Forces to build a new “multi-component barrier system” which “helped the military achieve the previously unreachable goal of 100 percent prevention of terrorist infiltration” (Kerhsner 2005, 167). Because of this newly modernized and well-thought-out barrier system, “hundreds of attempted infiltrations were thwarted inside the buffer zone before the terrorists ever reached the electronic fence” (Kerhsner 2005, 167). The modernized Gaza Fence successfully proved its effectiveness by eliminating suicide terrorists’ successful

attacks and lowering overall casualties due to rockets and mortars to a rate acceptable to the Israelis. As a result, the Gaza fence helped forge needed support among Israelis for the construction of the current Israeli Security Fence.

During the summer of 2005 the Israelis began pulling back from the Gaza Strip as rocket attacks from Gaza continued to increase (Kershner 2005, 162). The withdrawal from Gaza by the Israeli Defense Forces has given the Palestinian Authority a chance to prove its ability to control terrorism from within its territory while enabling the Israelis to finalize construction of the Israeli Security Fence. While the Palestinian Authority complains about the Israeli Security Fence construction, the Israelis point out the Palestinian Authority's inability to provide security and law and order as a new government.

A third-order effect of the success of the Gaza Fence was the increase in mortar attacks and the creation of the Qassam rocket, a "primitive, locally produced rocket with a small explosive warhead and an initial range of three kilometers" (Kerhsner 2005, 168). The increase in rocket attacks and the ever-increasing sophistication of the rocket fabricators has enabled Palestinian terrorists to conduct harassing fires from Gaza, leaving the Israelis with little recourse other than retaliatory strikes and harassing raids (Kershner 2005, 171). Most likely the Israeli Security Fence will cause the terrorists to use rocket attacks instead of suicide attacks, leaving some Israelis to believe that construction should stop. This belief has possible validity due to the fact that rockets fired from the West Bank are in range of more populated areas in Israel than rockets fired from Gaza. Furthermore, Gaza is much smaller and more easily controlled than the vast area of the West Bank. However, Major General Uzi Dayan stated "to stop building the barrier

because of the Qassams would be like refusing to take antibiotics for an infection because it will not wipe out all disease” (Kershner 2005, 177). This opinion highlights the fact that the Israelis are attempting to lower the rates of terrorist attacks to very low, acceptable levels through construction of the Israeli Security Fence. Therefore, the Gaza Strip as a case study supports the construction of the Israeli Security Fence as an effective solution to reduce, but not necessarily halt, Palestinian terrorism in Israel.




Figure 7. Gaza Fence Completed vs Israeli Fatalities
Source: (Kershner 2006; and Israeli Ministry of Defense 2006).

Historical Walls Comparison

In many ways the Berlin Wall is similar to the Israeli Security Fence. The Berlin Wall separated the population in a divided country, was semi-permanent along a

contested border, and was and could be used as a political bargaining chip between two opposing parties. Even though the Berlin Wall was confined to a city, its reach was international. Similarly, the impact of the Israeli Security Fence has international implications. The book *The Berlin Crisis of 1961: Soviet-American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin* (1973) provides a dramatic look into the political maneuvering between the Soviet Union and the United States over Berlin and most importantly discusses how the Berlin Wall became a flashpoint during the Cold War. A divided Germany and Berlin were most dramatically viewed by the international community by the construction of the Berlin Wall. In the book *Berlin: The Wall Is Not Forever* (1967), the argument is made that despite the Berlin Wall and all of its foreboding strength, it is not permanent. Furthermore, the book predicted that an armed wall separating people ultimately will not work and will come down. Overwhelmingly, the literature describing the reasons for the Berlin Wall, the outcome of the construction of the wall, and the catalysts for the bringing down of the wall can be used as predictions as related to the Israeli Security Fence. In *Wall: the inside Story of Divided Berlin* (1989), the history of the wall is discussed in depth. The construction of the wall and the objectives of the wall as part of a greater political strategy by the Soviet Union outlines in many ways the case for the Israeli Security Fence.

Walls in history are sometimes symbolic. As the Berlin Wall was constructed, it symbolized the wall between East and West: a divided Germany and a divided Europe. Much like the Berlin Wall, the Israeli Security Fence, even though it is not yet completed, symbolizes a greater division than that of the Palestinians and the Israelis. It symbolizes the division between East and West, the religion of Islam and that of the Jewish and

Christian religions. Volumes of literature come to the conclusion that religious, political, and ethnic divisions in history have been over land or territory or both. The sides have been separated by walls. Some walls are real brick and mortar with guard towers, no-man's-land, armed guards, electronic devices and fierce dog patrols.

The Korean Peninsula with its DMZ has divided North and South Korea since the 1950s. Much like the Berlin Wall, the DMZ is divided by a zone between the two countries and is most dramatically centralized in one area. Panmunjom, like Berlin, is where North and South Korea have constructed a central location where both sides enforce a cease-fire using armed forces and continue a separation of the Korean people through a constructed barrier. The book *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications* (1999), makes the case for an imminent reunification of the people of North and South Korea. Reasons why the unification will occur are similar to the reasons why the Berlin Wall failed and the South African apartheid system failed. If the Israeli Security Fence is to be successful, the lessons learned from the Korean DMZ and South Africa's Apartheid system must be considered.

Many walls have used economic, educational, administrative and regulation to enforce separation. Segregation and separation through these means were most dramatically witnessed in South Africa with the implementation of Apartheid. *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1990*, Volume 5, *Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1979* (1997) provides dramatic and detailed accounts of the process and implementation of the apartheid government of South Africa. Ultimately, the Bantustans of South Africa illustrate the societal walls between two distinct populations within one geographical area. Much like the racial

divisions in South Africa, the Israeli Security Fence is a division that solidifies the societal divisions that already are occurring in Israel between Arab and Jew. Furthermore, the fence sets up a semi-permanent boundary much like the semi-permanent boundary in South Africa during the years of apartheid. South Africa's Bantustans had in some areas walls or fences constructed to cordon off the population of black South Africa from white South Africa. But, in the South African experience, they were mostly artificial walls that used apartheid laws and societal regulations to achieve wall-like results. Further comparisons to Israel and South Africa are made in Marwan Bishara's book *Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid Occupation, Terrorism and the Future* (2002). Bishara makes the case that Israel's strategy of isolation, segregation, and dependency against the Palestinians is much like that of the apartheid government of South Africa.

Symbolic and virtual walls are similarly effective in the separation of people. In *The Great Wall and The Empty Fortress* (1997) the author argues that strong brick and mortar walls as well as symbolic walls and walls of ideology prove just as effective. The Great Wall of China is described as a weakness, a defensive measure, and a device used for protracted conflict. The wall is psychological and later gives way to virtual ideological barriers which are used to control and separate different populations of citizens and the international community. Interestingly, the Great Wall of China's lengthy history, its successes, and its failures, can be directly linked with contemporary issues surrounding the Israeli objectives of the security fence. Furthermore, *China's Three Thousand Years: The Story of a Great Civilization* (1974) describes relevant points to the success of the Great Wall of China and how it united a nation by separating the invaders from the country's citizens. How the Chinese interpreted the use of the wall as a way of

forging a nation is not dissimilar to the way the Israelis have viewed the construction of the Security Fence.

Summary

As of 2006, the Israelis have continued to build the security fence along the route of the Ministry of Defense plan and have slightly deviated in the areas where Israeli settlements may be removed from the West Bank. Key developments, such as the Israeli return of the Gaza Strip to Palestinian Authority control, the opening of the border between Gaza and Egypt, and the possible forced removal of Israeli settlers in the West Bank by Israel strengthen the importance of the construction of the Israeli Security Fence. If the Palestinian authorities are successful in the creation of the Palestinian state, Israel's unilateral construction of the fence and its actual location of the borders may be considered temporary and negotiable. The Israeli government "intends for the invasive fence to serve as a bargaining chip with the Palestinians in future negotiations" (Gavrilis 2004, 13). Israel has recognized that earlier, failed attempts at peace with the Palestinians "gave leverage to settler organizations and terrorists" (Gavrilis 2004, 13). The unilateral implementation of the security fence isolates both Palestinian terrorists and Israeli radical settler groups from preventing a peaceful solution between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Gavrilis 2004, 8). Furthermore, the plan implemented becomes less and less important over time if the continued Israeli policy of removal of settlements from the West Bank is continued or expanded. Therefore, if West Bank withdrawal continues, the most contentious item remaining to be negotiated is the status of Jerusalem.

If the Israelis are successful at creating a two-state solution but leave a reduced but fast growing Palestinian population inside of Israel which continues to outpace the Israeli's population growth, at some point the Israelis will find themselves in the exact same circumstance with "a looming Palestinian population crisis that threatens the hegemony of a Jewish State" (Makovsky, 2004, 23-27).

For a mutually agreeable conclusion to this conflict the following must occur:

1. A reduction of Palestinian terrorism
2. A long-term peace accord between the Palestinians and Israelis
3. A sustainable Jewish majority within Israel
4. An economically and politically viable Palestinian State
5. Agreement on the final status of Jerusalem and its holy sites

Without all of these problems being rectified peacefully, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will continue unabated (Maskovy 2003, 16). The criterion listed above is not all inclusive and success or failure of each may be at least partially determined by the construction location of the Israeli Security Fence.

CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Israel has determined that the creation of a de facto two-state solution is its only option. Terrorism has been significantly reduced in the areas where the fence has been constructed. The Israelis are fighting Palestinian terrorism by attempting to defeat an insurgency. Contributing factors for the decrease in terrorism in Israel may include:

1. The death of Yasser Arafat and the change of leadership in the Palestinian Authority
2. The war in Iraq and a possible temporary change of priorities of the terrorist or insurgent supporters.
3. Conflict fatigue, and or a wait-and-see attitude, by the Palestinians due to the return of Gaza, the opening of the Gaza border with Egypt, and preliminary Israeli intent to remove selected settlements on the West Bank (Kershner 2005, 88).
4. An increase in Israeli Security Forces operating in the West Bank.
5. Palestinian terrorist organizations declared ceasefires.
6. Israeli control of all check points and crossing points on both sides of the Israeli Security Fence.

Case Study Summary and Conclusions

The researcher concluded from the case studies that the Ministry of Defense plan should continue as deemed necessary by the State of Israel. The plan only slightly differs from the Clinton Parameters, and when compared, the differences are so slight that

modification to either plan will not significantly change the final borders which ultimately will be negotiated over time. It is true that “Concrete panels can be easily and quickly moved, for it is clear that the borders in a political settlement will be different to those of today” (Kershner 2005, 157). If enacted, either plan affirms that the Israel Security Fence moderately contributes to the reduction of Palestinian terrorism in Israel. The Gaza case study validated the initial concept of the Israeli Security Fence. Its perceived success proved to be significant in the Israeli decision to construct much more ambitious Israeli Security Fence. The success of the Gaza fence promoted the necessary public support needed to begin the separation of the Palestinians and Israelis and to create a de facto two-state solution. It is true that just building the fence will not ultimately solve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Some feel that “a barrier is not a solution, and is not a substitute for a negotiated border that would guarantee both sides what they seek: for Israel, “security” and for Palestinians “freedom and dignity” (Kershner 2005, 78). This opinion recognizes the fact that the Israeli Security Fence is a means to an end. It has lead to a reduction in Palestinian terrorism, a greater sense of security among Israelis, and may lead to an eventual agreement on permanent borders.

The data does not reflect a possible Israeli belief that by constructing the Israeli Security Fence overall security will be sustainable. The perception that the Israeli Security Fence will increase Israeli security seems to have solidified support of the Israeli population for construction of the fence. However, there is a large difference in territorial size and population demographics between Gaza and the West Bank. Therefore, the amount of Israeli security forces needed to successfully conduct counterterrorism operations is vastly different. Because of this fact, a significant increase in successful

attacks from the West Bank may alter the Israeli perception of the Israeli Security Fence as a means for sustainable security.

Assessment

The researcher concluded that the Israeli Security Fence has proven to be moderately effective. (See figure 8 below) As the Israelis focused their determined efforts on interdicting Palestinian terrorists, the construction of the fence has caused “100 percent difficulty in carrying out attacks” (Kershner 2005, 100). Successful suicide attacks are down while the numbers of interdicted attacks are up. Israeli casualties and injuries due to Palestinian terrorism declined every year as the total number of kilometers of fence increased, as figure 8 shows. Therefore, the Israeli Security Fence “has proved extremely effective in sealing the militant hotbeds of the northern West Bank from Israel” while “major attacks inside the Green Line, and even against the West Bank settlements, have become rare” (Kershner 2005, 88).




Figure 8. Fence Completed vs Suicide Attacks, Prevented, and Israeli Fatalities
Source: (Erich 2006; and Israeli Ministry of Defense 2006).

Recommendations

The data supports the fact that construction of the Israeli Security Fence is currently achieving almost all of its objectives. Most importantly, the Israeli Security Fence is contributing to the reduction of the number of Israelis killed by Palestinian terrorists. Construction of the Israeli Security Fence along the Ministry of Defense planned route should continue. A two-state solution is closer to reality than before construction began on the Israeli Security Fence. Conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis will be reduced. However, religious differences and future conflict will not be solved until the status of Jerusalem and permanent borders of a new Palestinian state are negotiated amicably and peacefully by both sides. Additionally, the international

community must increase its support for the Palestinian Authority. Strengthening the Palestinian Authority will lead to a more stable environment between the two countries. Coordinated efforts between Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the international community to disrupt, discourage, and prevent radicals of both sides is needed to prevent the continued undermining of the peace process. Furthermore, continued Israeli removal of West Bank settlements and transfer of authority of Israeli-controlled Palestinian territory to the Palestinian Authority is necessary. All of these recommendations, if implemented, will ensure that the Israeli Security Fence continues to be effective at reducing Palestinian terrorism in Israel. But, the fence alone will not resolve the political, economic, security, or religious challenges facing the two sides.

Recommendations for Expanded Research

The Israeli Security Fence as an effective solution to reduce Palestinian terrorism in Israel only scratches the surface of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Therefore, the researcher recommends that as a security system the Israeli Security Fence should be further studied after its full implementation. Additionally, the following areas of emphasis may assist in the understanding of the possible outcomes the construction of the Security Fence may create:

1. Combating an insurgency using security and separation
2. Economic impacts of separation of populations and its effects on an insurgency
3. External support of the Palestinian Authority and its economic impact on terrorism in Israel
4. The strategy of terrorism, counterterrorism, and politics in Israel and Palestine
5. Counterterrorism operational factors and effects in the West Bank

Summary

The reality is that the Israeli Security Fence as a solution to reduce Palestinian terrorism is working. However, it is most likely a short-lived deterrent or obstacle for the Palestinian terrorists. Terrorists, like most adversaries, are clever and solve problems by creating ways to bypass security measures. Furthermore, once simple solutions are found, previously unthought-of offensive attacks may defeat tactics that the Israeli Security Fence currently can handle. However, for now the Israeli Security Fence is effective in the reduction of terrorism. More importantly, the Israeli Security Fence forces the peace process to be rekindled due to its de facto creation of a two-state solution. That is, as the facts on the ground create semi-permanent borders, negotiations for a final long-term solution may be possible. Supporters of the Palestinian terrorists will have less reason to provide weapons, cash, and fresh recruits to attack Israel while their new country becomes more interested in economic and peaceful ventures. The Israeli Security Fence may in fact achieve its objectives, if political and economic issues between the two adversaries are resolved quickly, and peacefully.

Addendum - May 2006

According to one Talmudic legend, by the time the Messiah comes, Jerusalem will be ringed by seven walls. (2005, 157)

Isabel Kershner

On 4 May 2006, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel stated that “we must preserve a stable and Jewish majority in our State.” He further stated his own personal convictions that the entirety of the land of Israel is a “historic and eternal” right of the people of Israel. He advocated continued “disengagement from the Gaza Strip” and

“throughout Judea and Samaria” because this area creates “an inseparable mixture of populations which will endanger the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish state.” Furthermore, he stated that he will continue the current plan of “partition of the land for the purpose of guaranteeing a Jewish majority is the lifeline of Zionism” (Olmert 2006). He went on to advocate cooperation with the Palestinian Authority if it is “committed to the roadmap, which fights terror, dismantles terrorist organizations, abides by the rules of democracy and upholds, practically and thoroughly, all agreements which have been signed with the State of Israel” (Olmert 2006).

On the subject of the Israeli Security Fence, the Prime Minister stated that it “will be adjusted to the borders formulated east and west . . . along borders that must be defensible” (Olmert, Ehud, 2006). An essential point made was that the borders of Israel will be “significantly different from the areas controlled by the State of Israel today” and will be “defined in the coming years” (Olmert 2006).

Essentially, Israel restated its objectives and validated the conclusions made in this thesis. Israel remains connected to its Zionist heritage, committed to the protection of a Jewish majority through separation as defined by the continued construction of the Israeli Security Fence, and the continued war on Palestinian terrorism and insurgency through military force and broad international negotiations.

CHAPTER 4

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The modern conflict in the Middle East between the Palestinians and Israelis has generated volumes of literature that discuss solutions to the ever-changing crisis. The Israeli Security Fence is a contemporary, current, and ongoing contributor to the continuation or solution of the conflict in the Middle East. Because of its current relevance, the literature available about the fence is small in comparison to the literature available about the overall conflict. Opinions about the Israeli Security Fence widely vary. The continuation of available literature on this subject is certain.

Unilateral Solutions

The Israelis embarked upon a unilateral solution to the peace process with the advent of the security fence. The Israelis did this because they do not trust the Palestinian Authority to carry out its promise to provide security and halt terrorist attacks (Makovsky 2004, 16-21). The Israelis have been fighting various levels of Palestinian guerilla warfare that has finally transitioned to homicide bombing or suicide bombing as a form of terrorism (Levy 2000, 40-43). Traditional guerrilla warfare became unfeasible, not cost effective, too-time consuming, and fundamentally it just plain failed (Levy 2000, 40-43). The Palestinians chose this transition to terrorism because they were unable to effectively continue to wage higher forms of warfare against the Israelis.

There are many possible solutions to this conflict and several are fair. However, in *A Defensible Fence: Fighting Terror and Enabling a Two-State Solution*, David

Makovsky makes the point that the security fence, if constructed properly, will create the conditions for a two-state solution by creating a de facto border and achieve the Israeli-stated goal to increase security and/or stop terrorism. If the security fence is completed along the 1967 border between Israel and the West Bank, it could achieve a solution to the conflict initially through de facto or unilateral separation but lead to a final negotiated peace between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples while preserving Israel as a Jewish state (Elizur, 2003). Due to the course the Israelis have chosen, it seems unimportant at this juncture what objections the Palestinians express. However, in the long run the Palestinian acceptance of the Israeli unilateral solution will become important.

Currently, the Palestinians have a completely different opinion of the fence. They view the fence as a wall tearing through the West Bank, one that is like an Apartheid wall that is nothing more than a land annexation project by the Israelis and is nothing more than an expulsion of people based upon racist imperialistic policies *Why the Fall Anti-Apartheid Action Program* (2004). The aspects and implications of the fence are discussed in *Focus Section: Separation or Conciliation* (2002). *Violence and Its Alternatives* (2003) determined what possible impact the security fence might have if built between Israel and the West bank using pre-1967 borders. The political impact is addressed as well as the outcome of political violence within Israeli and Palestinian society. The book *Native vs. Settler: Ethnic Conflict in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland, and South Africa* (2000) provides detailed data and compares and contrasts the similarities in these differing geographic locations while explaining ethnic conflict.

Ethnic Conflict and Territory Disputes

Much of the literature reviewed covered the problems associated with the management and regulation of conflict between ethnic groups and natives versus settlers over disputed territory. *Unsettled States Disputed Lands; Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza* (1993) covers the changing shape of states, state building and state contraction, changing hegemonic patterns and its applications in Israel. Using this material to explore the changes the Israeli Security Fence may or may not cause but certainly is trying to achieve is important. Not only does this material cover the key Israeli issues, but it also covers historical disputes in Ireland. Contemporaneously, the Israelis are using copied or modified techniques that the British used which are working in Ireland today. British attempts at disengagement in Ireland are not unlike the Israelis' attempt at disengagement or separation with the Palestinians. *Shared Space Divided Space: Essays on Conflict and Territorial Organization* (1990) describes Ireland as separatism and integration, while it describes Israel as involuntary incorporation and finally South Africa as imposed separation. Each case fundamentally can be studied and contribute to answering the question: Is the Israeli Security Fence an effective solution to reduce Palestinian terrorism in Israel?

In *The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict* (1993) the author makes an attempt to directly link ethnicity and territory to national identity. This linkage is the stimulus for conflict, and the cases of Britain and Ireland, South Africa, and Israel are covered. Similarly, in *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict regulation* (1993) the same case studies are explored but in terms of how governments can regulate ethnic conflict. Using previously successful cases of how successful international intervention helped stop

ethnic conflict is why the book *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (2000) is relevant to the Israeli Security Fence as a solution to reduce Palestinian terrorism in Israel. This book discusses de facto borders and partition as a reason for Bosnian independence as well as the fear of additional de facto borders that if left unchallenged would cause the ethnic conflict to become even more difficult to solve. In *Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security* (1996) the problem of Israeli Security is defined in terms of the choices Israel must make reference land for peace and the prospect for peace if the Palestinian state is actually feasible. However, in *The One State Solution* (2005) the case is made that a two-state solution as constructed by the Israeli Security Fence will only result in a Palestinian state which is not feasible and will create even more instability for Israel. Solutions to this dilemma are put forth in terms of a one-state solution. This material is essential because it takes a counter view to the current objective of Israel and the reasons for the creation of the security fence. Conversely, *Sharon's Endgame of the West Bank Barrier* (2004) makes the case for the fence and describes the barrier as “a tool of Israeli grand strategy . . . that holds great potential for resolving the long-standing conflict” by isolating Jewish settlements outside of Israel and facilitating Israeli “disengagement” from the West Bank (Gravillis 2004, 14). Additionally, the description of the Israeli plan states that it “is designed to take more land than Israel intends to keep to guarantee that the Palestinians return to the negotiating table to ask for the return of fenced-in land” (Gravillis 2004, 13).

Summary

This review of literature enabled the researcher to look deeper into the issues surrounding the Israeli Security Fence through the research and analysis of others in

order to determine how to more effectively to consider and appropriately analyze the primary research question.

CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This research analyzed Palestinian terrorist trends before and during the construction of the Israeli Security Fence, historical walls comparisons in history, and construction plan comparisons in order to determine if the Israeli Security Fence can achieve its desired outcome. The primary question to answer is the following: Is the Israeli Security Fence an effective solution to reduce Palestinian terrorism in Israel? While studying this primary question, additional subordinate questions appeared.

Subordinate questions

During the course of research the following subordinate questions emerged:

1. Will the erection of the security fence lead to a successful two-state solution?
2. Will the root cause of the Palestinian insurgency be solved or inflamed by the security fence completion?
3. Can the Israelis continue to give back territory, create a de facto two-state solution, and defeat an insurgency without solving the Jerusalem problem?
4. Does the unilateral construction of the security fence delay or create the conditions for a more lengthy conflict, much like the construction of the Berlin Wall?

Problem-Solving Methodology

The methodology used to construct this research project was first done by identifying the problem, developing a hypothesis, gathering pertinent facts and information and then determining which facts and information once analyzed could be

used to solve the thesis primary question. After organizing these facts into outcomes and then putting them into an organized outcome, an analysis was completed. The conclusion of this methodology resulted in recommendations and conclusions.

Identifying the Problem

During the initial stages of research the problem was not clear. First the researcher sought to determine the problem in a historical context and then develop a basic background or framework to begin research. The security fence is not a simple problem and numerous questions arose: What is the correct time period to research?, what does the conflict between the two sides have to do with the fence? what is the significance of the fence in terms of the overall peace process?, which side is right and which is wrong in terms of the fence location and construction and is there room for negotiation and settlement of the final fence location upon completion? The researcher was inundated with an overabundance of current television news coverage describing the current conflict in terms of terrorism and the stalled peace process. The identification of the problem became a daunting task and one that seemed impossible to answer without putting the limits and scope of the problem into a manageable framework. However, after finishing numerous reading and study sessions and with the guidance of an experienced committee, the researcher narrowed down the extent of the problem. Framing the primary question and developing specific supporting secondary questions previously listed enabled the researcher to shape the first chapter of this thesis.

Hypothesis Development

The second step that the researcher developed revealed that the topic had historical examples that related directly to the current situation in Israel today. Further, that the use of these examples could help prove or disprove the researcher's initial theory. At the closing stages of this phase, the researcher formed the basis for the literature review that was assembled.

Gathering Facts and Classifying Materials

The beginning of the third phase of the process began with the researcher searching for and acquiring additional material, other sources such as periodicals, books, news articles, and web pages to ensure factual information was gathered. Acknowledged sources were included in this process, and the researcher focused primarily on recently published sources that focused on the Israeli Security Fence while relying on numerous other older articles for background information regarding the history of the conflict and other walls in history. The collected materials were classified into three areas: security fence objectives, historical comparisons of separation walls, and the current situation of peace process. The researcher studied and judged sources for relevancy and usefulness for inclusion in the research paper. After reducing the reference list, a closer examination of the remaining sources was conducted to ensure adequate and pertinent material for analysis. At the conclusion of this gathering and examination of material, the basis of the second chapter was formed and set the boundaries for additional analysis.

Fact Organization into Outcomes

This step proved to be critical as additional information was reviewed and organized. As security fence objectives, historical comparisons of separation walls, and the current situation of peace process were analyzed, the researcher attempted to collate the data and manage the separation of information into usable outcomes. Each area was developed and considered in regards to the primary and subordinate questions. The outcome of this analysis prepared the researcher to offer and state conclusions along with recommendations in chapter two of this thesis.

Results and Collation into Chronological Order

The last two steps in the research method was the development of outcomes and recommendations after careful analysis of the conclusions. Putting the outcomes into a coherent and chronological order sorted out the development of recommendations for additional study which is also presented. The recommendations and conclusions are the basis for the third chapter.

Significance of Study

The Israeli unilateral decision to build this fence will have consequences both in the war against terrorism in Israel and the future of the Arab-Israeli peace process. The fence may contribute to the shortening or lengthening of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and if the lengthening of this process causes the propensity for more devastating attacks, it possibly will lead to more deaths than would have occurred if the fence had not been constructed. If the desired effect in the Arab-Israeli peace process is the formation of a Palestinian state and a permanent peace between the two nations, the Israeli Security

Fence may delay or quicken the path towards a longer lasting peace. A study of the Israeli Security Fence, as an effective solution to reduce Palestinian terrorism in Israel, will enable the researcher to contribute more effectively during Army operations that involve the protection of populations in terrorist-filled environments. Finally, a study of the Israeli Security Fence may contribute to the discussion of this important conflict and could enable a viable recommendation for a solution to the Palestine-Israeli conflict which is an international issue of importance in the Global War on Terrorism.

Limitations

This study was limited due to the constraints of the researcher's time while being a full-time Army officer working at the United States Army Command and General Staff College. Constraints on funding prevented the researcher from traveling to Israel, New York, Ireland, South Africa, China, or Washington, DC, to conduct personal interviews, make observations, or collect data that is unavailable at the Command and General Staff College.

Summary

The researcher attempted to place the Israeli Security Fence in the context of the overall Palestinian-Israeli peace process, to compare historical separation walls and conflict, and to discuss the prevention of Palestinian terrorism in Israel. The researcher developed categories of applicable research questions and conducted a wide literature assessment into the aforementioned areas. The researcher compared two construction plans and offered a recommendation to achieve the best results in terms of the cessation

of successful terrorist attacks, the formulation of a two-state solution and the best prospect for a lasting peace.

GLOSSARY

- Apartheid. A social policy or racial segregation involving political and economic and legal discrimination against non-whites; the former official policy in South Africa (WordNet, Princeton University. 2003).
- Bantustan. Any of the former Black homelands in South Africa (WordNet, Princeton University. 2003).
- Cypriot. A native or inhabitant of Cyprus. Also called Cyprian. Of or relating to Cyprus or its people or culture. Of or relating to Cypriot Greek (Houghton Mifflin. 2000).
- Gaza Strip. A coastal region at the southeastern corner of the Mediterranean bordering Israel and Egypt; "he is a Palestinian from Gaza (WordNet, Princeton University. 2003).
- Green Line. Border marking the boundaries of the land that Israel won in its 1948 war of independence (WordNet, Princeton University. 2003).
- Guerrilla War. Usually indigenous military or paramilitary unit operating in small bands in occupied territory to harass and undermine the enemy, as by surprise raids (WordNet, Princeton University. 2003).
- Intifada. An uprising by Palestinian Arabs (in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank) against Israel in the late 1980s and again in 2000 (WordNet, Princeton University. 2003).
- West Bank. A disputed territory of southwest Asia between Israel and Jordan west of the Jordan River. Part of Jordan after 1949, it was occupied by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. In 1994 an accord between Israel and the PLO was signed, giving Palestinians limited self-rule and requiring measured withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank (Houghton Mifflin. 2000).
- Zionism. A Jewish movement that arose in the late 19th century in response to growing anti-Semitism and sought to reestablish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Modern Zionism is concerned with the support and development of the state of Israel. (WordNet, Princeton University. 2003)

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